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A WOULD-BE TIGER: ASSESSING VIETNAM'S PROSPECTS
FOR GAINING MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS FROM
THE UNITED STATES
The United States did not remove its trade embargo against
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam' until February 1994;2 never-
theless, foreign investors have labeled Vietnam as "the next
Asian Tiger."' Optimism among Vietnamese and foreign inves-
tors has increased since the lifting of the embargo, particularly
in light of the 8.2% annual growth in Vietnam's Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) that has occurred over the past five years.4 In
1. Vietnam is located in Southeastern Asia on the South China Sea, between
China and Cambodia. See CENTRAL INTELUGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK
1995, at 453 (1995). The area of Vietnam is 331,000 square kilometers. See Vietnam
at a Glance-Key Facts and Figures, Reuters North American Wire, June 27, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Asiape Library, Vietnm File. The population was estimated at
74 million people as of June 1996, making Vietnam the world's 13th most populous
country. See id.; Vietnam: UN Chief Calls for More VN Exposure in International
Press, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Oct. 31, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiape Library,
Vietnm File.
2. See Merrill Goozner, Clinton Opens Door to Vietnam: Firms Get Access to
'Asian Tiger; Some Vets Protest, CHi. TRiB., Feb. 4, 1994, at 1; Ruth Marcus &
Thomas W. Lippman, Clinton Lifts Vietnam Trade Embargo: President Calls It 'the
Best Way' To Ensure Progress on MIA Issue, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1994, at Al; Paul
Richter & Michael Ross, Clinton Lifts Vietnam Embargo To 'Resolve the Fate' of
M!As, LA TIMES, Feb. 4, 1994, at Al; Bellanne M. Toren, The Curtain Is Raised on
Vietnam: An Update on the Lifting of the U.S. Embargo, ACCA DOCKET, Spring
1994, at 94; see also Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.578 (1996)
(authorizing transactions involving property in which Vietnam or its nationals have
an interest, including, but not limited to, importations from and exportations to Viet-
nam, new investment, travel-related transactions and brokering transactions); Ex-
ports to Vietnam; Country Group Y, 59 Fed. Reg. 6524 (1994) (codified at 15 C.F.R.
pts. 770, 771 & 785 (1996)) (removing Vietnam from the list of countries to which
U.S. exports are prohibited and adding Vietnam to the list of countries to which
U.S. commodities and technical data may be exported on a case-by-case basis).
3. Paul Cleary, Vietnam: 1995 To Be Watershed on Future of Economy, AUSTL.
FIN. REV., May 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnm File.
4. See Reginald Chua, Vietnam May Stick with Status Quo: Communist Leaders
Aren't Expected To Step Up Economic Reforms, ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 25, 1996, at
1, available in 1996 WL-WSJA 10216667. In 1997, Vietnam's GDP is projected to
grow at a rate of 8.5%, compared to a world growth rate of 2.9%. See Daniel Green,
Fast Growth Forecast Targets Asia and Africa, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 3765994.
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addition, exports jumped 200% between 1990 and 1995, from
$1.73 billion to $5.3 billion,5 and, during the first half of 1995,
foreign investment more than doubled compared to the same
period in 1994, reaching $3.6 billion.6
Despite this good news, it would be premature for investors to
put all of their capital in Vietnam; many problems plaguing the
country since the imposition of the trade embargo continue.
Vietnam remains among the poorest nations in the world, with a
per capita GDP of approximately $290 per year.7 In addition,
Vietnam's trade deficit soared to $3.6 billion over the first ten
and a half months of 1996, up from a deficit of $2.3 billion for all
of 1995.8 Finally, Vietnam's legal system continues to befuddle
potential investors because its opaqueness and lack of consisten-
cy make it difficult for investors to assess properly the potential
costs and risks of doing business in Vietnam. In an effort to
correct these problems, the Vietnamese government has em-
barked on an ambitious program to transform its former state-
run economy into a market-based system.10
Critical to Vietnam's attempts to reform its economy will be
its ability to integrate itself into the international trading sys-
tem. Both Vietnam's newly acquired membership in the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)11 and its recent sign-
5. See Vietnam: Sustaining the Reform Momentum, UNION BANK SvITZ. COUNTRY
REP., May 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10088585 [hereinafter Reform Momentum].
6. See Vietnam: Country Update, EIU ViewsWire, Oct. 5, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Alleiu File. The Export-Import Bank has rated Vietnam as
the fifth most promising country for foreign direct investments in the medium-term
(three years) and the third most promising in the long-term (10 years). See Anne
Swardson & Sandra Sugawara, Asian Workers Become Customers; Foreign Companies
Create New Markets Then Move On, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1996, at Al.
7. See Vietnam: December 1995, HILFE COUNTRY REP., Dec. 1, 1996, available in
1996 WL 11753473.
8. See Vietnam Update, EIU Country Risk Service, Dec. 10, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Alleiu File.
9. See License Cancellations Puzzle Hanoi, BUS. VIETNAM, Dec. 1996, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnm File.
10. See Thomas R. Stauch, Comment, The United States and Vietnam: Overcom-
ing the Past and Investing in the Future, 28 INT'L LAW. 995, 1008-20 (1994).
11. See Raphael Pura, Regional Powerhouse: ASEAN Role Expands As Line
Grows To Join Dialogue, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 28, 1995, at 1, available in 1995
WL-WSJA 8779444. In addition to Vietnam, ASEAN includes the countries of Thai-
land, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Indonesia. See Sherry M.
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ing of a trade cooperation agreement with the European Union
in July 199512 are viewed by Vietnam's Communist-controlled
government as stepping stones to its ultimate objective: the
granting of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status by the United
States.' Obtaining MFN trading access to the U.S. market is
critical to establishing successful trade relations between the
United States and Vietnam.'4 MFN status would allow Viet-
nam to export its products into the United States at the lowest
available tariff rates and compete with similar products from
other countries on an even playing field. 5
The purpose of this Note is to assess Vietnam's prospects of
gaining MFN status from the United States. This Note begins by
looking at Vietnam's history since the end of the Vietnam War
to familiarize the reader with the events leading to Vietnam's
current situation. Next, this Note describes the primary barriers
to Vietnam's realization of MFN status. In particular, this Note
examines the procedural and political steps involved in attaining
MFN status, which culminate in a bilateral trade agreement. 6
Finally, this Note reviews the potential obstacles, in particular
Communist ideology and poor infrastructure, which may threat-
en Vietnam's reform program and, by extension, future MFN
status. Ultimately, this Note concludes that although the attain-
ment of MFN status certainly is within Vietnam's grasp in the
near future, Vietnamese leaders cannot afford to slow Vietnam's
current rate of reform, even if such reform comes at the expense
of state control.
Stephenson, ASEAN and the Multilateral Trading System, 25 LAW & POLY INTL
Bus. 439, 439 (1994). ASEAN was created in 1967 to facilitate cooperation on social,
cultural, and economic matters and to promote peace in Indochina. See id.
12. See Vietnam Enters Economic Pact with the EU, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 18,
1995, at 5, available in 1995 WL-WSJA 8778474.
13. See Barry Wain, Asian Economic Survey 1995: Vietnam, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 9, 1995, available in 1995 WL-WSJA 10225174.
14. See Sesto E. Vecchi & Lisa Levaggi Borter, U.S. MFN Status for Vietnam, E.
ASIAN ExEcuTivE REP., May 15, 1995, at 6, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Easian File.
15. See id.
16. See id.
19971 1585
1586 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1583
BACKGROUND
Immediate Postwar Period
After the fall of Saigon to the Communist forces of North Viet-
nam on April 30, 1975,"7 the United States imposed a compre-
hensive trade embargo against Vietnam under the authority of
the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA).'5 The period
immediately following the imposition of the trade embargo re-
sulted in tense relations between the two nations, particularly
after President Gerald Ford denied Vietnam's request for aid
from the United States pursuant to the Paris Peace Agreements
of 1973.'9 President Ford cited Vietnam's untruthfulness and
unfair wartime practices as the basis for his denial" and de-
clared that the two countries would have no trade relationship
until Vietnam fully accounted for the fates of the thousands of
American soldiers lost either as prisoners of war (POWs) or
missing in action (MIAs) during the war.2
17. See Peter G. Furniss, The United States-Vietnam Trade Relationship: Politics
and Law in the Process of Normalization, 35 HARV. INTL L.J. 238, 238 (1994).
18. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1994). TWEA authorizes the President, during a time
of war, to "investigate, regulate, or prohibit, any transactions in foreign exchange,
transfers of credit or payments," or "importation or exportation of ... any property
in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest." Id. § 5(b)(1)(A)-
(B). TWEA originally was intended to apply only during wartime, but it was extend-
ed to nonwartime situations by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), see Stauch, supra note 10, at 1006, which authorizes the President to exer-
cise any powers given to him by 50 U.S.C. § 1702 in order to deal with any "unusu-
al and extraordinary [external threat] to the national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with
respect to such threat." International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 §
202, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994); see also Stauch, supra note 10, at 1006-08 (discussing
how the President's statutory emergency and wartime powers under TWEA and
IEEPA may be exercised).
19. See Beth Castelli, Comment, The Lifting of the Trade Embargo Between the
United States and Vietnam: The Loss of a Potential Bargaining Tool or a Means of
Fostering Cooperation?, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 297, 304-05 (1995). Under the Paris Ac-
cords, the United States was to have paid North Vietnam '$3.2 billion to repair the
damage caused by U.S. bombing. See D.R. SARDESAI, ViETNAM: TRIALS AND TRIBULA-
TIONS OF A NATION 128 (1988).
20. See Castelli, supra note 19, at 304-05.
21. See id. at 305. In addition to extending the embargo, the United States ve-
toed Vietnam's application to join the United Nations three times between 1975 and
1976. See id.
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Relations between the United States and Vietnam grew even
cooler in 1978 when Vietnam announced that it would become
an ally of the Soviet Union2 and followed that announcement
by invading Cambodia and establishing its own government
there.' The Carter Administration responded to the Cambodi-
an invasion by severing all contacts with Vietnam, effectively
halting any progress toward the normalization of relations be-
tween the United States and Vietnam for the next decade. 4
Cut off from the United States and non-Communist nations,
who feared jeopardizing their own trading relationships with the
United States,' Vietnam had little choice but to rely almost
completely on the Soviet Union and the Communist satellite
nations of Eastern Europe as trading partners.26 The Vietnam-
ese government subsequently structured its newly unified econo-
my based on the principles of communism and central plan-
ning.27 The transition was not successful, however, and Viet-
nam began to experience economic problems almost immediate-
ly. Once-prosperous industries began to fail under centralized
state planning, and Vietnam's average per capita income fell to
less than $200 per annum, making Vietnam one of the poorest
countries worldwide.29 By the mid-1980s, the Vietnamese gov-
ernment realized that its socialist economy was failing." When
22. See WILLIAM J. DUIKER, VIETNAM: REVOLUTION IN TRANSITION 211 (2d ed. 1995).
23. See id. at 211-12.
24. See id. at 211.
25. See Stauch, supra note 10, at 1008-09.
26. See id. at 1009. Following the war, the Soviet Union provided Vietnam with
about $3 billion in economic and military aid annually, including essential manufac-
turing materials such as cotton, fuel, fertilizer, and steel. See id.
27. See id. Under the Soviet system, the government controlled the economy. See
Luke Aloysius McGrath, Note, Vietnam's Struggle To Balance Sovereignty, Central-
ization, and Foreign Investment Under Doi Moi, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2095, 2101
(1995). "[State-owned] enterprises followed a centrally administered system in which
the state orchestrated the supply of raw materials, labor relations, production levels,
and budgets." Id. at 2102.
28. See Stauch, supra note 10, at 1009. The only year in which Vietnam's econ-
omy operated at a surplus was 1976. See id. Throughout the 1980s, Vietnam's econo-
my could not support itself. See id. For a discussion of Vietnam's efforts to orient its
economy towards a socialist bent, see generally DUIEER, supra note 22, at 139-49.
29. See Stauch, supra note 10, at 1009. In addition to its internal economic
problems, Vietnam accrued a foreign debt in excess of $13 billion by 1990. See id.
30. See id. at 1010. Vietnam's economy reached its lowest point in 1986, as food
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the Soviet Union, suffering its own economic problems,
drastically reduced its aid to Vietnam, the Vietnamese govern-
ment was forced to begin reforming its economy by implement-
ing measures aimed at bringing market forces into its economic
system.3
Doi Moi Reform Period
Technically, Vietnam's reform process began before the mid-
1980s because the Vietnamese government introduced economic
reforms as early as 1979.2 Reforms had no significant effect,
however, until the Communist Party's Congresses of 1986 and
1991. 33 The most dramatic reforms began during the Commu-
nist Party's Seventh Congress in 1986, when the government
instituted the economic policy of doi moi, which means "'economic
renovation' or 'change for the new'."34 The central principle of
doi moi is "rapid industrial growth and development through
increased foreign investment."35 Under doi moi, the Vietnamese
government allowed market forces to operate subject to close
state supervision.3 6 By 1989, the government had eliminated the
last vestiges of central planning 7 by decollectivizing agricultur-
al land and removing price controls on most commodities.38
At the core of doi moi is the Law of Foreign Investment of 1987
(FIL), which reflects the Communist Party's recognition that
expanding Vietnam's economy will require the support and capi-
tal of foreign investors.3 9 "With a view to expanding economic
supplies dwindled to an all-time low and inflation approached 800%. See No More
Planning's Chains Shall Bind Us, ECONOMIST, July 8, 1995, at V13.
31. See Stauch, supra note 10, at 1010.
32. See id. at 1009. In particular, farmers were permitted to sell their produce
on the open market. See DUIKER, supra note 22, at 148.
33. See Stauch, supra note 10, at 1009-10. These reforms included liberalizing
economic planning and relaxing controls on domestic and foreign trade. See DUIKER,
supra note 22, at 152.
34. Clifford J. Shultz II et al., American Involvement in Vietnam, Part II: Pros-
pects for U.S. Business in a New Era, Bus. HORIZONS, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 21.
35. McGrath, supra note 27, at 2096.
36. See Stauch, supra note 10, at 1010.
37. See McGrath, supra note 27, at 2103.
38. See id.
39. See Stauch, supra note 10, at 1011.
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cooperation with foreign countries, developing the national econo-
my, [and] stepping up export on the basis of effective exploitation
of natural resources, labour and other potentialities,"40 the FIL
sets forth general guidelines for foreign investment, allowing
various investment vehicles,41 and guaranteeing the invest-
ments against expropriation.42 The implementation of the 1987
FIL evidenced "a firm commitment by the Vietnamese
[g]overnment to build a strong and stable Vietnamese econo-
my." 43 Other nations were quick to invest their capital in Viet-
nam with the hope to profit from Vietnam's enormous economic
potential." The Vietnamese government approved $7.8 billion
in foreign investment projects between 1988 and 1994.4' Despite
Vietnam's success in attracting new investors, however, the U.S.
embargo still loomed large over the developing country, dimin-
ishing the luster of the government's achievements.46 Without
the support of the United States, it appeared unlikely that Viet-
40. Preamble, Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam of 1987 (1987 FIL),
amended by Act of June 30, 1990, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 930 (1991). The FIL con-
sists of 42 articles divided into six chapters. See id. Chapter I (articles 1-3) sets
forth general provisions and a policy statement on foreign investment. See id. arts.
1-3. Chapter II (articles 4-19) lists the various forms of investment permitted in
Vietnam. See id. arts. 4-19. Chapter III (articles 20-25) contains the terms for profit
repatriation and a guarantee against expropriation or nationalization, as well as a
section on dispute settlement. See id. arts. 20-25. Chapter IV (articles 26-35) lists
rights and obligations of foreign organizations and investors and addresses taxation,
rents and royalties, and customs duties. See id. arts. 26-35. Chapter V (articles 36-
38) sets forth the responsibilities of the State Organ for Management of Foreign In-
vestment. See id. arts. 36-38. Finally, Chapter VI (articles 39-42) contains various
measures regarding the implementation of the FIL. See id. arts. 39-42.
41. See id. art. 4. The investment vehicles permitted by the FIL are joint ven-
tures, contractual business cooperations, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. See
infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
42. See id. arts. 20-21. Article 21 states that "the invested capital and assets of
a foreign organisation and private person shall not be requisitioned and expropriated
by administrative measures; [tihe enterprise with foreign invested capital shall not
be nationalized." Id. art. 21.
43. Stauch, supra note 10, at 1019.
44. See id. Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan have been among the largest in-
vestors. See Jeremy Grant, Survey of Vietnam (2): Dissent in the Ranks-Overseas
Ventures Are Dismayed by the Scant Evidence of a Reduction in Bureaucracy, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 1995, available in 1995 WL 11159031.
45. See Stauch, supra note 10, at 1019.
46. See id.
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nam could attain its goal of becoming the next "Asian tiger."7
U.S.-Vietnam Relations
Under the terms of the trade embargo, U.S. citizens and busi-
nesses were prohibited from conducting most financial and busi-
ness-related activities with Vietnam or its nationals." Included
in the prohibition were the import and export of goods, all finan-
cial and commercial dealings, and any transaction incident to
transportation or shipping entered into by persons subject to
U.S. jurisdiction.49 The Office of Foreign Assets Control froze
Vietnamese assets by prohibiting all transactions involving
those assets within U.S. jurisdiction." The embargo originally
was intended to isolate Vietnam from "Western economic trade,
aid, and investment,"5 but, in later years, the embargo became
a means to maintain bargaining power over the Vietnamese in
an effort to resolve the issue of American MIAs.52
Initially the embargo effectively cut Vietnam off from the
West and forced the Communist government to turn to the So-
viet Union and its Eastern European allies."' In addition to en-
forcing the embargo, the United States discouraged other coun-
tries from providing international aid to Vietnam following
Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1979, further increasing
Vietnam's isolation.54
47. See id. at 1019-20.
48. See Sesto E. Vecchi & Michael J. Scown, Vietnam's Opening Door: U.S. Em-
bargo Shuts Out Only American Firms, E. ASIAN ExEcUTIvE REP., Dec. 15, 1989, at
20, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Easian File.
49. See Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. §5(b)(1)(A)-(B)
(1994). The embargo continued to allow American companies, however, to gather in-
formation and assess the business climate. See Vecchi & Scown, supra note 48, at
20. It also permitted remittances to close relatives in Vietnam. See id.
50. See Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1996); Stauch,
supra note 10, at 1006. But see 31 C.F.R. § 500.578 (1996) (permitting transactions
involving property in which a designated national of Vietnam has an interest).
51. Vecchi & Scown, supra note 48, at 20.
52. See Stauch, supra note 10, at 1020 n.177. Without the embargo, veterans'
groups feared that the United States would lose the economic leverage necessary to
force the Vietnamese government to turn over information about American MIAs. See
id.; see also infra note 74 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
54. See Stauch, supra note 10, at 1007-08. The U.S. embargo prohibited the
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After Vietnam began to implement its reform program in the
mid-1980s,55 however, foreign corporations and private inves-
tors began to take advantage of the economic opportunities of-
fered by Vietnam.56 As they watched foreign investors seize
prime investment opportunities, American businessmen became
increasingly frustrated with their inability to participate.57 The
American business community thus began to pressure the U.S.
government to lift the embargo.58 In response to this mounting
pressure, President George Bush proposed in April 1991 that the
United States commence normalizing relations with Vietnam,
including an eventual lifting of the trade embargo.59
President Bush's proposal consisted of a four-phase "road
map,"" which set forth terms and conditions that the Vietnam-
ese government would have to fulfill in order to complete the
normalization process.6' A key action required during the first
phase of the plan was the signing of a Cambodian peace accord
by Hanoi on October 23, 1991.62 In addition, during the first
phase of the normalization process, Vietnam was expected to
cooperate fully in resolving all American POW/MIA cases, specif-
ically with regards to the "discrepancy cases" and "live-sighting
reports," and to "rapidly repatriate readily recoverable remains"
of MIAs."' In return, the United States would begin talks on
normalizing relations and would allow American citizens to
travel to Vietnam.'
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian Development
Bank from lending to Vietnam. See id. at 1008.
55. See supra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
56. See Stauch, supra note 10, at 1020.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See Castelli, supra note 19, at 311; Nayan Chanda, 'Road Map' To Renew
Ties with Hanoi Could Lead to Some Trade by Year End, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15,
1991, at A10.
60. See Chanda, supra note 59, at A10 (quoting United States Assistant Secre-
tary of State Richard H. Solomon).
61. See id.
62. See Castelli, supra note 19, at 311.
63. Chanda, supra note 59, at A10.
64. See id. In order to begin talks with the Vietnamese government, the United
States also lifted the 25-mile-ban in New York, which effectively had barred all Viet-
namese diplomats from leaving the city. See id.
1997] 1591
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During the second phase of the normalization process, Viet-
nam continued its efforts to resolve the POW/MIA situation, and
the United States responded by restoring telecommunications
links with Vietnam and lifting restrictions barring nongovern-
mental organizations from exporting humanitarian goods to
Vietnam.65 The United States also sent a high-level delegation
to Hanoi to work out the details of the normalization process.66
Phase Three began after implementation of the Cambodian
peace settlement plan and it continued into the Clinton Admin-
istration." Vietnam has been required to withdraw troops from
Cambodia, uphold the Paris Peace Agreement, and continue
working on the POW/MIA issue.68 Under the terms of the "road
map," in July 1993, the United States retracted its opposition to
international aid for basic human needs and rebuilding infra-
structure in Vietnam. 69 Accordingly, countries participating in
the International Conference on Development Assistance for
Vietnam, held in November 1993, pledged $1.86 billion in
loans.v The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank followed in October 1994 by approving loans totalling ap-
proximately $700 million and promising additional funds in the
65. See Castelli, supra note 19, at 312; Chanda, supra note 59, at A10.
66. See Castelli, supra note 19, at 313. Commercial transactions that met basic
human needs also were approved by the U.S. State Department. See Chanda, supra
note 59, at A10.
67. See Castelli, supra note 19, at 313.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 313-14; Stauch, supra note 10, 1022. In addition, in 1994, Con-
gress repealed section 13 of the Department of State Appropriation Authorization Act
of 1973 which had prohibited federal financial assistance to Vietnam without
Congress's express authorization. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Re-
lated Programs Appropriations Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-306, § 526(b), 108 Stat.
1608, 1632 (1994); Brenda A. Jacobs et al., Economic Normalization: Charting the
Next Steps; Part I: Diplomatic Relations, Economic Assistance, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE
REP., Jan. 15, 1996, at 8, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Easian File. Despite
the repeal of section 13, however, Congress still may not grant aid to Vietnam be-
cause of the Brooke Amendment to the 1995 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.
See § 512, 108 Stat. at 1627. Under this provision, the United States cannot provide
aid to any country that has been in default for more than one calendar year on any
U.S. foreign assistance loan. See Jacobs et al., supra. Vietnam has been in default
on loans from the United States since 1976. See id.
70. See Thai Phuong, Foreign Financial Activities in the New Stage of Develop-
ment, THOI BAO TAi CHINH, Jan. 5, 1995, at 6, reprinted in Article Comments on
Financial Development, FBIS-EAST ASIA DAILY REP., Feb. 2, 1995, at 61, 62.
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future.7 Significantly for U.S. businesses, in Phase Three Pres-
ident Clinton permitted American firms to bid on internationally
financed projects in Vietnam.72 As of July 1996, the United
States had become the sixth largest foreign investor in Vietnam,
with $1.2 billion having been invested.73
Despite the promised benefits for U.S. businesses, the decision
to continue the normalization process was not easy for the
Clinton Administration to make because most veterans' groups
urged the President to withhold IMF funds in order to pressure
the Vietnamese to be more forthcoming in resolving the
POW/MIA issue."4 In response to the veterans' groups' concerns,
President Clinton required Vietnam to make further progress re-
garding the POW/MIA situation before the embargo would be
lifted and the normalization process could proceed to Phase
Four.7" Indeed, when President Clinton eventually lifted the
embargo on February 4, 1994, he tried to make it clear that eco-
nomic considerations had played no role in his decision; rather,
he cited "significant tangible progress" on the POW/MIA issue by
the Vietnamese government as the impetus for the decision to
lift the embargo.76
The lifting of the embargo signaled the end of Phase Three;
71. See id.
72. See William Branigin, Hanoi Hails Embargo End As Step To Better Ties,
WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1994, at A22.
73. See Keith B. Richburg, Still Seeking Profits in Vietnam, WASH. POST, July
13, 1996, at A12.
74. See Castelli, supra note 19, at 314.
75. See id. at 315. President Clinton cited four specific requirements with which
Vietnam had to comply before the embargo would be lifted. First, all American re-
mains were to be returned to the United States, and Vietnam was to document its
efforts to recover these remains. See id& Second, the 92 discrepancy cases and live
sightings were to be resolved. See id. Third, Vietnam was to investigate further
POW/MIA records in Laos. See id. Finally, increased efforts to provide all POW/MIA
records from Vietnamese archives were required so as to complete U.S. military re-
cords. See id.
76. See Marcus & Lippman, supra note 3, at Al. President Clinton's decision to
lift the embargo was supported by many members of Congress who had served in
Vietnam, including Senator John McCain of Arizona, who remarked: "The United
States gave its word that we would lift the embargo if the Vietnamese substantially
cooperated with us to determine the fate of our missing. They have done so. It
would be unfair, and beneath the dignity of the United States, to go back on our
word now." Goozner, supra note 2, at 1.
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Vietnam and the United States currently are in the middle of
Phase Four.77 Although business dealings now are permitted
between the two countries, full normalization of relations has
yet to occur.7" In the final phase of the plan, the United Na-
tions will oversee free elections in Cambodia and will remove
the remaining restrictions on lending to Vietnam by internation-
al financial institutions." On July 11, 1995, President Clinton
announced the opening of diplomatic relations with Vietnam. 0
Further normalization of relations between the United States
and Vietnam will pave the way for the United States to consider
Vietnam's eligibility for a broad range of economic programs and
benefits, including designating Vietnam as a "beneficiary devel-
oping country" for purposes of the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences (GSP),5 ' giving aid to Vietnam in the form of grants and
loans from the Export-Import Bank 2 and the Overseas Private
77. See Castelli, supra note 19, at 316.
78. See id. at 317.
79. See Chanda, supra note 59, at A10.
80. See Clinton Normalizes Ties to Vietnam; Acknowledges Economic Interests,
Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA), July 12, 1995, available in LEXIS, Exec Library,
Drexec File [hereinafter Clinton Normalizes Ties]; John Rogers, Vietnam Hails Ties,
Targets U.S. Trade, Technology, Reuters North American Wire, July 12, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnm File. On May 23, 1996, President Clinton
took another step toward normalizing relations between the two countries by nomi-
nating Representative Pete Peterson of Florida to serve as the first U.S. ambassador
to communist Vietnam. See Thomas W. Lippman, Former POW Nominated Ambassa-
dor to Vietnam, WASH. POST, May 24, 1996, at A25. In March 1997, the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee unanimously voted to approve Peterson's nomination, send-
ing the nomination to the Senate floor. See Richard Sisk, Fund Woes Snarl Prez'
Vietnam Envoy Pick, DAILY NEWS (New York), Mar. 5, 1997, at 2, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File. However, Senator Robert Smith of New Hamp-
shire has threatened to hold up Peterson's nomination because of unrelated cam-
paign finance concerns. See id.
81. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1994). The GSP allows the United States to grant
generalized tariff preferences to certain imports from developing countries. See JOHN
H. BARTON & BART S. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 518 (1986).
Vietnam currently is ineligible for the GSP because it is a Communist country. See
19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(1). Communist countries specifically are excluded from GSP con-
sideration unless (1) they enjoy MFN status; (2) they are members of the GATT and
of the IMF; and (3) they are not "dominated or controlled by international commu-
nism." See id.; see also Brenda A. Jacobs et al., Economic Normalization: Charting
the Next Steps; Part II: MFN and GSP Status, Export Controls, Investment and Tax
Treaties, WTO, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Feb. 1996, at 9, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Easian File.
82. The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Exim), codified at 12 U.S.C.
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Investment Corporation (OPIC),"3 and granting MFN status to
Vietnam." The next section of this Note focuses on the key
benefit for the Vietnamese-MFN status-and discusses the ob-
stacles that Vietnam faces in its attempt to gain this important
benefit.
MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS
What Is Most Favored Nation Status?
Title 19, section 1881 of the United States Code describes
MFN status as the U.S. government's grant to another country
of the same "duty, or other import restriction or duty-free treat-
ment proclaimed in carrying out any trade agreement," unless
otherwise provided for by law." In essence, MFN status imple-
ments the concept of nondiscrimination in the U.S. treatment of
its trading partners: By extending MFN status, the United
States gives that nation's exports the same preferential treat-
ment that it grants to nearly all of its trading partners. 6
In practice, under the American Harmonized Tariff Schedule
§§ 635-635(t) (1994), was established as an independent government agency in 1945
for the purpose of financing and facilitating exports by U.S. companies. See BARTON
& FISHER, supra note 81, at 70. Eligibility for the Exim Bank is subject to Jackson-
Vanik considerations. See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text; see also U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. NORIALIZES DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM (1995),
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Dstate File [hereinafter U.S. DEPT. OF STATE]
(describing the requirements for Exim borrowing and applying them to Vietnam).
83. OPIC, codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200(b) (1994), provides insurance for
U.S. firms against losses incurred in developing countries caused by currency ex-
change controls and expropriation. See BARTON & FISHER, supra note 81, at 915.
OPIC also is subject to Jackson-Vanik eligibility. See infra notes 98-106 and accom-
panying text; see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 82 (describing the conditions
under which OPIC insurance will be issued). OPIC access is especially critical to
U.S. businessmen who seek the reassurance that their investment will be protected
in the event of political and social upheaval in Vietnam. See Vietnam Trade: US
Politics, Legal Restraints Stall MFN Status, EIU ViewsWire, July 9, 1996, available
in LEXIS, Asaipc Library, Alleiu File.
84. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 82 (outlining the statutory requirements
for MEFN status); see also infra notes 91-106 and accompanying text.
85. 19 U.S.C. § 1881 (1994).
86. See Jacobs et al., supra note 81, at 9. In contrast, under the GSP, which al-
most exclusively benefits less developed countries, certain products may enter such
countries duty-free. See 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1994). Vietnam is ineligible for the GSP
because it is a Communist country. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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(HTS), two duty-rate columns determine the import duties that
a country must pay to U.S. Customs. 7 Column I sets forth the
MFN duty rate, which is levied upon all imports from countries
that either are members of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), now the World Trade Organization (WTO),
or have executed bilateral trade agreements with the United
States.8 In contrast, column II comprises the statutory rates
that apply to imports from countries that do not enjoy MFN sta-
tus. 9 These countries must pay considerably higher duties for
all goods, making them less able to compete with other produc-
ers in the U.S. market.90
How Do Countries Acquire Most Favored Nation Status?
In order for Vietnam to receive MFN status, Vietnam and the
United States must negotiate a bilateral commercial agreement
in accordance with U.S. trade law.9 The President's authority
to negotiate such an agreement is set forth in the Trade Act of
1974.92 Under section 2435 of that Act, the President may au-
thorize bilateral commercial agreements that provide nondis-
criminatory MFN treatment to the exports of countries previous-
ly denied such treatment if the President determines that such
action would be in the national interest.93 Bilateral agreements
may last a maximum of three years and are renewable for addi-
87. The Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) was passed under the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.)
1107, 1147-50.
88. See Jacobs et al., supra note 81, at n.47. Vietnam is not currently a member
of the WTO. See infra note 256.
89. See Jacobs et al., supra note 81, at n.47. Currently, the only countries other
than Vietnam that do not have U.S. MFN status are Afghanistan, Cuba, Cambodia,
Laos, North Korea, Montenegro, and Serbia. See id.
90. The MFN tariff for goods entering the United States is typically less than
four percent; the average non-MFN duty rate, on the other hand, is over 50%. See
id. Woven cotton dresses from Vietnam, for example, are assessed at a 90% tariff
rate when they enter the United States; with MFN status, however, a tariff of only
12.2% would-be assessed. See Brenda A. Jacobs, For Vietnam, Economic Normalcy
Trails Diplomacy and Politics, BOBBIN, Oct. 1995,; at 14, available in 1995 WL
12115260.
91. See Clinton Normalizes Ties, supra note 80.
92. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495 (1994).
93. See Trade Act of 1974 § 405(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2435(a).
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tional three-year periods.9 4 Such agreements are subject to joint
congressional approval."
In addition to negotiating a bilateral agreement, a country
seeking MFN status must follow several procedural steps set
forth in Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974.9" In particular, two
restrictive conditions impact Vietnam's ability to negotiate a
bilateral agreement. First, in determining whether to extend
MFN status, the President may consider a country's level of co-
operation in assisting the United States' efforts to recover Amer-
icans missing in action in Southeast Asia.9"
A more burdensome restriction is the Jackson-Vanik Amend-
ment, which makes MFN status dependent on a country's emi-
gration policies.9" Under the Amendment, the United States
may withhold MFN status from a nonmarket economy country if
the country denies its citizens the right to emigrate, imposes
more than a nominal tax on emigration or emigration docu-
ments, or levies more than a nominal tax or fee on any citizen
as a consequence of a decision to emigrate.99 Once a country is
designated as being subject to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, it
may only receive MFN status in one of two ways. First, the
President can report to Congress that the country is not in viola-
tion of any of the emigration conditions.0 0 Alternatively, the
President has the discretion to waive the emigration require-
ments if he determines that such waiver will promote the
Amendment's objective of promoting fundamental human
94. See id. § 2435(b)(1). To renew an agreement, the President must find that "a
satisfactory balance of concessions in trade and services has been maintained during
the life of [the] agreement" and that "reductions in [U.S.] tariffs and nontariff barri-
ers to trade . . . are satisfactorily reciprocated by the other party." Id. In addition,
the President may suspend or withdraw nondiscriminatory treatment at any time,
thereafter assessing tariffs on all products from that country at the column II rate.
See id. § 2434(c).
95. See id. § 2435(c). A joint resolution of approval by both Houses of Congress
is necessary in order for an agreement to go into effect. See id. § 2437.
96. See id. §§ 2431-2440; Vecchi & Borter, supra note 14, at 6.
97. See 19 U.S.C. § 2433. This section also affects a nonmarket economy
country's eligibility for the GSP program, Exim Bank lending, and OPIC insurance.
See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
98. See 19 U.S.C. § 2432; Vecohi & Borter, supra note 14, at 6.
99. See 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a).
100. See id. § 2432(b).
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rights'0 ' and he has been assured that the emigration practices
of that country will lead to the achievement of that objective.0 2
Such a waiver is issued for a period not to exceed twelve
months; however, Congress may vote to deny the waiver.10
3
For all practical purposes, the requirements of the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment have been extended in recent years to in-
clude an evaluation of a country's history of democracy and hu-
man rights, as evidenced by the debates over the annual reviews
of China's MFN status 4 and the denial of MFN status to both
Poland and Romania on human rights grounds.0 5 Although no
separate formal waiver exists regarding democracy or human
rights, the U.S. government has attempted to make human
rights a third criterion by which to evaluate a country's compli-
ance with the statutory requirements.' °
101. See id. § 2432(c)(2)(A). Section 2432(a) states that the purpose of the Amend-
ment is "[to assure the continued dedication of the United States to fundamental
human rights" through scrutinizing a country's emigration practices. Id. § 2432(a).
102. See id. § 2432(c)(2)(B). Most former column II countries have received MFN
status by waiver and not as a result of compliance with emigration policy require-
ments. See Vecchi & Borter, supra note 14, at 6.
103. See 19 U.S.C. § 2432(d). However, Congress "has never rejected a Presiden-
tial waiver of compliance with emigration policies." Vecchi & Borter, supra note 14,
at 6. Moreover, it is unclear whether Congress even has the right to do so, in light
of the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), in which
the Court held that legislative vetoes of executive decisions are unconstitutional. See
Paul Lansing & Eric C. Rose, The Granting and Suspension of Most-Favored-Nation
Status for Nonmarket Economy States: Policy and Consequences, 25 HARV. INTL L.J.
329, 346-47 (1984).
104. See Jacobs et al., supra note 81, at 9. For a general discussion of the U.S.
government's history regarding application of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to China's
MFN status, see L. Jay Kuo, Comment, Farewell to Jackson-Vanik: The Case for Un-
conditioned MFN Status for the People's Republic of China, 1 ASIAN L.J. 85 (1994).
105. See Robert H. Brumley, Jackson-Vanik: Hard Facts, Bad Law?, 8 B.U. INTL
L.J. 363, 368 (1990).
106. See Vecchi & Borter, supra note 14, at 6.
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Why Vietnam Should Receive Most Favored Nation Status
Procedural Requirements
"United States Missing in Action Personnel in Southeast
Asia"',
Various veterans' groups had argued that Vietnam would be
unresponsive to the POW/MIA issue if the U.S. trade embargo
were lifted because such action would remove Vietnam's incen-
tive to cooperate in resolving the issue.' Now that the embar-
go has been lifted, the veterans' groups' arguments have shifted.
They now advocate using the grant of MFN status as a "carrot"
to be used to encourage further resolution of the issue. °9 The
Clinton Administration's response has been to focus on increased
cooperation between the United States and Vietnam through the
process of normalization as the key to getting the necessary res-
olution of the POW/MIA issue."0
Although it is tragic that the fates of all POW/MIAs have yet
to be resolved, it is doubtful whether such a full accounting ever
will occur. Indeed, during a trip to Vietnam to examine
POW/MIA records in March 1993, a Senate Select Committee
concluded that "it [is] time for normalization between the United
States and Vietnam, given that a full accounting of all bodies
from the war would be impossible.""' It seems foolish, there-
fore, to ignore the economic welfare of U.S. investors while
107. 19 U.S.C. § 2433.
108. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
109. See Vietnam: Political Risk Outlook, EIU Country Risk Service, Sept. 20,
1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnm File; infra notes 227-30 and ac-
companying text.
110. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 82. In a statement to the press follow-
ing the lifting of the embargo, President Clinton said: "Normalization of relations is
the next appropriate step. With this new relationship, we will be able to make more
progress." Id
111. Castelli, supra note 19, at 315-16. After returning from a recent trip to Viet-
nam, then-Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island reported to Congress that he was
"convinced that the government of Vietnam is being fully cooperative with the U.S.
on the POW/MIA issue and that, while this cooperation must continue, the issue
should not in any way hamper further development of the bilateral relationship."
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 104TH CONG., 2D SEss., DEMOC-
RACY: AN EMERGING ASIAN VALuE: A REPORT TO THE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE 8 (Comm. Print 1996).
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awaiting the completion of an unattainable goal. Moreover,
should evidence come to light that the Vietnamese have not
been completely forthright in their dealings on the POW/MIA
issue, the President retains the statutory authority to suspend
or withdraw the extension of MFN status at any time he deems
necessary, regardless of the length of time that the bilateral
agreement has been in place."' In short, the U.S. personnel in
Southeast Asia requirement should not be considered to be a
serious impediment to the successful negotiation of a bilateral
commercial agreement.
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment.'
Addressing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment's freedom of emi-
gration requirement, the Department of State's Report on Hu-
man Rights Practices for 1995 outlined a variety of restrictions
imposed by the Vietnamese government that limit the movement
of its citizens inside and outside of the country."' Among the
restrictions noted in the Report were approval requirements for
ethnic minorities seeking to travel outside of certain highland
areas, as well as outright denials of exit visas for Vietnamese
Muslims desiring to make the hajj.115 In addition, the Depart-
ment of State expressed some concern that members of minority
ethnic groups, particularly highland peoples, did not have access
to various resettlement programs."' The Vietnamese govern-
ment also has continued to monitor Vietnamese emigr6s who
had returned to visit, fearing them to be potential security
112. Under 19 U.S.C. § 2433, the President may withhold MFN status from a
nonmarket economy country if he finds that the country is not cooperating with the
U.S. in accounting completely for all United States MIAs in Southeast Asia, repatri-
ating any soldiers who still are alive, or returning the remains of deceased person-
nel. See 19 U.S.C. § 2433(a). Once having extended MFN status, the President still
may withdraw MFN status if he determines that the nonmarket country is not com-
plying with MIA requests. See id. § 2434(c).
113. See id. § 2432.
114. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 104TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1995, at 743-44 (Comm. Print 1996) [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES].
115. See id. at 744.
116. See id.
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threats. 1 7
Nevertheless, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment should not con-
tinue to be an obstacle to Vietnam's attaining MFN status."'
Two compelling reasons militate against the application of the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Vietnam. First, the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment originally was intended to apply only to the
Soviet Union's policy on Jewish emigration and, therefore,
should be inapplicable in Vietnam's case." 9  Second, the
Amendment's distinction between market and nonmarket econo-
mies fails to account for the transitional nature of Vietnam's
economy and threatens to impede Vietnam's progress toward be-
coming a market economy.2 '
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment emerged from the United
States' policy of d6tente with the Soviet Union 2' and was tai-
lored to deal specifically with the issue of Jewish emigration
from the Soviet Union.'22 In fact, even though the legislative
117. See id.
118. For an opposing view arguing that Vietnam's emigration policies should be
sufficient alone to deny Vietnam MFN status under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment,
see Davis Frye, Vietnam's Contemporary Battle with the United States: Vying for
Most Favored Nation Trading Status, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 777, 786-88 (1996).
119. Cf. Kuo, supra note 104, at 104 (discussing the applicability of the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment to China).
120. Cf id. (discussing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment's nonmarket distinction and
its effects on China).
121. See id at 101. The Nixon Administration hoped to use better trade relations
with the Soviet Union as a "carrot" in order to improve diplomatic relations between
the two countries. See id. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated, "[O]ur justifica-
tion for increased trade with the Soviet Union has never been based primarily on
economic grounds ... . We see it as a tool to bring about or to reinforce a more
moderate orientation of foreign policy and to provide incentives for responsible inter-
national behavior .... " Id. (alteration in original).
122. The Amendment was a joint effort by Jewish lobbyists and conservative
politicians to deter establishing Soviet trade relations by linking the grant of MFN
status to the issue of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. See id. They enlist-
ed the aid of Senator Henry Jackson, who introduced and attached the Amendment
to the proposed Trade Act of 1974. See id. at 101-02; Trade Act of 1974 § 402, 19
U.S.C. § 2432 (1994). The Soviet Union subsequently accused the United States of
pursuing a "'policy of extortion,'" and after President Ford signed the law into effect
on January 3, 1975, the Soviets pulled out of their 1972 Trade Agreement with the
United States. See Kuo, supra note 104, at 102-03. As a result, the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment prevented the Soviet Union from gaining MFN status before its collapse
in 1991. See Kevin M. Cowan, Comment, Cold War Trade Statutes: Is Jackson-Vanik
Still Relevant?, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 737, 742-43 (1994).
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history indicates that the Amendment applied to "all Communist
countries except Poland and Yugoslavia,"" 3 even the bill's
sponsor, Senator Henry Jackson, was said to have been sur-
prised at the scope of the Amendment's coverage when China's
request for MFN status arose during the late 1970s." Given
that the Jackson-Vanik Amendment was intended to apply only
to the Soviet Union, it does not seem appropriate to continue to
apply the Amendment to Vietnam. By continuing to apply the
freedom of emigration requirement to Vietnam but not to other
similarly situated countries, the United States is perpetuating
an inconsistent policy that lacks any coherent basis.
In addition, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment should not apply
in Vietnam's case because Vietnam is in the midst of transform-
ing its economy into a market-based system. The Amendment
provides that "products from any nonmarket economy country
shall not be eligible to receive nondiscriminatory treatment" if
that country restricts freedom of emigration.'25 The official
U.S. policy has been that Vietnam must satisfy the terms of the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment before it can be eligible to receive
MFN status.'26 In making this determination, the United
States has categorized Vietnam as a nonmarket economy with-
out considering how the Jackson-Vanik Amendment applies to
countries with transitional economies. The Amendment itself
does not address how to treat nonmarket systems in transition
to market economies."' Nor does the 1988 Trade Act, 2'
which provided a statutory definition of a nonmarket economy
for the first time, make any mention of how to treat transitional
123. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 1974 U.S.C.C.AN. (88 Stat. 1978) 7334.
124. "Senator Jackson . . .was said to have been 'startled to find out that people
thought Jackson-Vanik applied to China. [It] never crossed his mind.'" Kuo, supra
note 104, at 104 (quoting Roger W. Sullivan, President, U.S.-China Business Council,
at United States-People's Republic of China (PRC) Trade Relations, Including Most-
Favored-Nation Trade Status for the PRC: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong. 124 (1990)) (alteration in
original).
125. 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (emphasis added).
126. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 82.
127. See Kuo, supra note 104, at 104.
128. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ("1988 Trade Act"), Pub. L.
No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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economies.'29 Section 1316 of the 1988 Trade Act defines a
nonmarket economy country as a "foreign country that.., does
not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so
that sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair
value of the merchandise."' Nowhere in the statute does it
suggest how to classify a nonmarket economy country that is in
the process of reforming itself.''
The silence of the statute on this point makes it difficult to
determine when the nonmarket designation no longer applies to
an economy in transition. In Vietnam's case, the reforms that
have been accomplished to date have been significant enough to
warrant Vietnam's classification as a developing market econo-
my, and not as a nonmarket economy. The Vietnamese govern-
ment clearly has embarked on a plan that embraces capitalist
market principles. l 2 Managers of the state companies have re-
ceived more autonomy and now are permitted to choose their
own products and set production goals, prices, employment lev-
els, and wages, just like their counterparts in capitalist coun-
tries.' 3 In addition, hard subsidies to state enterprises were
eliminated in 1989.13
Despite these changes, some state enterprises still are sup-
ported by preferential government treatment, such as cheap
credit, tax breaks, and better access to foreign exchange and
bank funds .' This fact alone, however, does not make Viet-
nam any more involved in its state industries than many other
foreign countries to which the United States has granted MFN
status.3 6 In denying MFN status to Vietnam, therefore, the
129. See Michael Kabik, The Dilemma of "Dumping" from Nonmarket Economy
Countries, 6 EMORY INTL L. REV. 339, 368-70 (1992).
130. § 1316, 102 Stat. at 1186-88 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A)).
131. See Kabik, supra note 129, at 377.
132. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
133. See Barry Wain, Vietnam Going Private: Vietnam Cautious on Selling State
Assets, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 1992, at 1, available in 1992 WL-WSJA
2010035.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. The French and Japanese governments play a large role in controlling pri-
vate industries. See Kabik, supra note 129, at 374. Under French dirigisme, govern-
ment agencies often consult major corporations regarding investment plans; the
French government owns some large private sector companies, including Air France
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United States risks harming the economic viability of the
country's burgeoning private enterprises that are the key to
Vietnam's transition to a market-based economy. By designating
Vietnam as a nonmarket economy, and thereby, subjecting it to
Jackson-Vanik restrictions, the United States threatens
Vietnam's ability to become a capitalist-oriented society.
Human Rights Considerations
Although Vietnam allows limited criticism of its policies, hu-
man rights advocates continue to emphasize that the country
remains a one-party state in which challenges to Communist
party leadership are not permitted."' In August 1995, the Unit-
ed States rebuked the Vietnamese government for "imprisoning
two Americans for 'peacefully' demonstrating,""' and warned
that similar actions would adversely affect Vietnam's efforts to
gain U.S. trade benefits."9 Additionally, although the Vietnam-
ese Constitution does endorse freedom of speech and freedom of
the press, in reality the rights to assemble, associate, and speak
freely still are severely restricted by the government. 40
The U.S. government, as a result of its great concern about
these and similar human rights infractions, has expanded Jack-
and Renault. See id. Japan uses administrative guidance rather than legislative or
regulatory measures to influence Japanese businesses. See id. at 371. Under admin-
istrative guidance, the Japanese government can recommend that businesses either
pursue or not pursue a particular course of action. See id at 372. If the businesses
fail to follow the recommendation, they may be denied certain licenses or restricted
in other ways. See id.
137. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-MSIAD-95-42, U.S.-VIETNAM RELA-
TIONS-ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS, (1995) available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Gaorpt
File; see also HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note 114, at 742 (noting that the
Vietnamese government continues to restrict speech that questions the Party's role).
138. U.S. Faults Vietnam on Human Rights Cases, Reuters North American Wire,
Aug. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnm File.
139. See id. In addition, the United States expressed concern about the fate of a
dissident Buddhist monk who was sentenced to five years in jail for offenses con-
nected with his attempts to provide humanitarian relief to flood victims. See id.
140. See HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note 114, at 742-43. The Vietnamese
government also continues to control the media. See id. at 742. In December 1995,
the Vietnamese government shut down an official newspaper for printing a story on
the alleged corruption of a government official. See Vietnam Shuts Newspaper Over
Corruption Report, Reuters World Service, Dec. 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Vietnm File; see also Frye, supra note 118, at 810.
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son-Vanik's purview to include human rights as a de facto con-
sideration in granting MFN status. 4' For its part, the Viet-
namese government has steadfastly rejected any linkage be-
tween human rights performance and trade benefits, stating:
"We are willing to continue a dialogue with the United States on
human rights, considering it as a global issue but not accepting
it as a condition for the trade and economic relations between
the two countries."42
Although Vietnam's human rights policy continues to raise
concerns, the U.S. policy of including human rights in Jackson-
Vanik considerations nevertheless should be abandoned. No-
where in Jackson-Vanik is MFN status made contingent on hu-
man rights policy. 3 The Amendment's wording and legislative
history make it clear that the restriction only applies to a
country's emigration policy.'" President Clinton implicitly rec-
ognized this fact in May 1994 when he decided to "'delink' U.S.
trade regulations from human rights issues" and granted China
MFN trading status.'45 Further, in contrast to the situations in
China and Vietnam, "[t]he revocation of MFN status was not
seriously considered for non-Communist nations such as Syria,
Iraq, Iran, or Libya, even during periods of gross human rights
141. For all practical purposes, Congress has extended Jackson-Vanik's purview to
include the issue of human rights since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. See
Jacobs et al., supra note 81, at 9; see also Frye, supra note 118, at 809.
142. Vietnam Slams Rights Condition on Trade with U.S., Reuters North Ameri-
can Wire, Aug. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnm File (quoting
Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Ho The Lan).
143. See Jacobs et al., supra note 81, at 9.
144. See 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1994). Undersecretary of State Joan Spero acknowl-
edged as much during a speech at the National Press Club when she stated that
"legally the link with Jackson-Vanik really has to do with immigration policy." Joan
Spero, Speech on U.S.-Vietnam Relations at the National Press Club (Oct. 3, 1995)
(transcript available from Federal Document Clearing House), available in 1995 WL
581074.
145. Lena H. Sun, China Applauds Trade Move; Dissidents Wary, WASH. POST, May
27, 1994, at A28 (referring to the Chinese government's official statement welcoming
President Clintoen's grant of MFN status to China); see also Michael Dobbs, Intervention
Gave Boost to Clinton, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1996, at Al (noting President Clinton's
acknowledgement that linking trade policy and human rights issues was a mistake in
China's case); Mary McGrory, The Price Is Rights, WASH. POST, May 31, 1994, at A2
(lamenting President Clinton's decision to grant China MFN status).
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violations in those countries."146
For its part, Vietnam should be less intransigent on the issue
of linking human rights to U.S. trade benefits. In its recent eco-
nomic cooperation accord with the European Union,147 the
Vietnamese government agreed to a human rights clause that
included a commitment to respect human rights and democratic
principles."4 Because Vietnam has shown a clear willingness
to recognize some link between human rights issues and trade
status with the European Union, it is inconsistent for the Viet-
namese government to continue rebuff the United States' similar
request.
Bilateral Commercial Agreement
Even if the procedural requirements mentioned above are
met, Vietnam and the United States still must negotiate a bilat-
eral commercial agreement. Before a bilateral agreement can be
reached, Congress must be convinced that any agreement made
will be mutually beneficial. To date, the U.S. government has
highlighted five areas of concern, including "import quotas, li-
censing, investment restrictions, [and] foreign exchange con-
trols [,] as well as [the] lack of effective dispute settlement mech-
anism[s] .'4
146. Kuo, supra note 104, at 105.
147. The agreement set up a framework for increased EU-Vietnamese economic
and trade cooperation, including MFN status for Vietnamese trade with EU member
countries. See Cooperation Agreement Between the European Community and the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, RAPID, July 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Li-
brary, ECnews File (Council of Ministers press release containing text of agreement).
148. See John Rogers, EU and Vietnam Make Human Rights Breakthrough,
Reuters North American Wire, July 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Vietnm File; see also Gillian Handyside, Euro-MEPs Agree Vietnam Deal, Stress Hu-
man Rights, Reuters North American Wire, Feb. 1, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Vietnm File (noting the European Parliament's insistence when approving
the agreement that Vietnam improve its human rights record).
149. Vietnam May Use U.S. Trade Talks as Base for WTO, Reuters Financial Ser-
vice, Oct. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiape Library, Vietnm File. Title 19, section
2435(b) of the Code lists two other areas that must be included in any bilateral
commercial agreement involving the United States: the protection of national security
and the protection of intellectual property rights, see 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b) (1994), nei-
ther of which will be discussed in this Note. Comments on the barriers that Viet-
nam faces in these areas have been made elsewhere. See, e.g., Frye, supra note 118,
at 793-94, 795-800.
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Import Quotas and Tariffs
Although critics of Vietnam's trade regime often contend that
a major obstacle to trade in Vietnam is its use of import quo-
tas,' this concern is overstated because Vietnam has made
significant progress toward eliminating quotas.' 5' Instead, the
quotas have been replaced largely by import tariffs as part of
the first phase of the country's trade liberalization process.'52
Although tariffs have increasingly replaced quotas, problems
remain. Vietnam's tariffs are set at an artificially high level be-
cause conservative government officials are afraid to expose the
thousands of remaining state enterprises to the rigors of free
trade.'53 As a result, Vietnamese tariff rates can be as high as
eighty percent.' Under Vietnam's law on export and import
duties in effect since March 1992, all imports and exports are
subject to duties once they cross the border.'55
150. See Paul Cleary, Vietnam Hits Imports After Deficit-Trade and Exporting,
AUsTRL. FIN. REV., Apr. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnm File.
Import quotas are less desirable than tariffs for two reasons. First, the implementa-
tion of a quota system encourages the risk of government corruption in licensing,
and shields from public view the protection granted to domestic producers. See JOHN
H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 366 (2d ed. 1986). Secondly, a quantitative restriction on a good gener-
ates additional income for the importer, as opposed to a tariff, which yields customs
revenue for the government. See id. at 33.
151. See Vietnam's Transition to a Market Economy: III: Reform Priori-
ties-Foreign Trade, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Feb. 15, 1994, at 8, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Easian File [hereinafter Reform Priorities-Foreign Trade].
Today, only rice and garments and knitwear exported to the European Union, Cana-
da, and Norway continue to be regulated by quotas. See Vietnam: Decision No. 864-
TTg of December 30, 1995 of the Policy on Commodities and the Regulation of Im-
port-Export in 1996, Vietnam Official Gazette, Apr. 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL
11778615 (art. 2).
152. See Reform Priorities-Foreign Trade, supra note 151, at 8. Tariffs are pref-
erable to quotas because they do not limit the amount of goods that a foreign exporter
may bring into Vietnam. Cf JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 150, at 366 (distinguishing
the quota as a trade barrier that does restrict the amount of goods imported).
153. See Cleary, supra note 150.
154. See Reginald Chua, Philippine Model? Vietnam May Be Taking Wrong Path
to Tigerdom, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL-WSJA
12478160.
155. National Assembly, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Law on Export and Im-
port Duties, ch. I, art. 1 (visited Oct. 28, 1996) <http://www.serve.net/vietnam/pages/
viet1445.html>.
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Vietnam's tariff structure, grounded in the Brussels Harmo-
nized System (BHS), is considered to be both "too simple and too
complicated."5 ' The structure is overly simple because the
classification nomenclature consists of a single column with a
single rate applicable to a group of individual commodities that
are not identified with sufficient detail.'5' As a consequence, it
is difficult to ascertain the tariff rate for commodities that are
not specifically listed in the customs code. 5 ' The tariff struc-
ture is complicated further by the fact that, in April 1995, the
Ministry of Finance announced that it would adjust import and
export duties on a quarterly basis, making it extremely difficult
for businesses to ascertain the correct tariff rate at any given
time."'59 The complexity of the system and the high tariff duties
deter foreign exports to Vietnam because they create uncertainty
as to the amount of customs duties owed and make imported
products prohibitively expensive in the Vietnamese market.'
Vietnam has attempted to address these problems by consoli-
dating the tariff classifications into five detailed lists of exports
and imports, each subject to different trade policies.'' This re-
form should bring more certainty and predictability to the deter-
156. Reform Priorities-Foreign Trade, supra note 151, at 8.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Tariffs and Import Taxes, EIU Investing Licensing & Trading, Apr. 1,
1996 available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Alleiu File.
160. High tariffs also harm Vietnam's economy because they encourage smuggling.
See Reform Priorities-Foreign Trade, supra note 151, at 8. During the first nine
months of 1995, smuggling accounted for almost $1.4 billion of Vietnamese imports.
See Smuggling Accounts for $1.4 Bln [sic] of Vietnam Imports, Reuters World Ser-
vice, Oct. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnm File [hereinafter
Smuggling]. In addition, high tariffs push resources into inefficient sectors of the
economy because domestic producers try to take advantage of the high financial re-
turns that result from higher levels of protection. See Reform Priorities-Foreign
Trade, supra note 151, at 8.
161. See Vietnam: Trade Regulations, EIU ViewsWire, Oct. 5, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Alleiu File. The lists include:
(1) banned exports and imports; (2) quota-restricted exports-including
garments, textiles and tapioca ... ; (3) imports subject to 'orientation
plans'-petrol and oil, fertiliser, cement, steel and explosives; (4) exports
and imports subject to guidelines of concerned government depart-
ments--chemical, pharmaceutical and construction materials; and (5) oth-
er goods . . .which can be freely exported and imported.
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mination of tariff duties owed by exporters and importers. In
addition, Vietnam's recently acquired membership in ASEAN
requires Vietnam to adhere to the ASEAN Free Trade Agree-
ment (AFTA), which calls for members to reduce tariffs on most
of the products traded in the region to a maximum rate of five
percent by the year 2003.162 As of January 1996, Vietnam had
lowered tariffs for approximately 1,600 items imported from oth-
er ASEAN countries to between zero and five percent.
63
Despite these encouraging signs, however, questions remain
regarding Vietnam's commitment to reducing tariffs. First, the
ASEAN partners granted Vietnam an extension until 2006 to
make the phased tariff reductions required of it under AFTA.'"
Moreover, the practical effect of the tariff reductions instituted by
Vietnam has been minimal because the reductions largely have
been replaced by additional import taxes, such as a consumption
tax, in an attempt to make up lost tariff revenue.'65
Instead of resorting to such measures, the Vietnamese govern-
ment should consider restructuring its tariff collection system
and reinforcing its borders against smugglers if it wishes to
prove to its trading partners that it is committed to lowering
162. See Ted Bardacke, Asean Makes Way for Vietnam: Partners Give Hanoi Extra
Time To Bring in Tariff Cuts, FIN. TIMS, Apr. 28, 1995, at 6, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allnws File. Under ASEAN's Common Effective Preferential Tariff
(CEPT) agreement, which covers over 40,000 types of products, Vietnam will be
required "to make its carefully controlled economy more transparent and clarify
trade and tariff policies." Philip McClellan, Vietnam Takes Cautious Steps Towards
Free Trade Area, Agence France Presse, Dec. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allnws File. Vietnam must lower its duties on over 2,200 items in order to
qualify for CEPT. See Johnson et al., Vietnam: New Tax Changes in Vietnam Likely
To Impact on Foreign Investors, BUS. MONITOR, Feb. 29, 1996, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
163. See Tariffs and Import Taxes, supra note 159.
164. See Lara Parpan, ASEAN Business Groups Give Tentative Welcome to AFTA
by 2000, Agence France Presse, Aug. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Allnws File.
165. See Vietnam: Decree No. 97-CP of December 27, 1995 of the Government De-
tailing the Implementation of the Law on Special Consumption Tax and the Laws on
Amendments and Supplements to a Number of Articles of the Law on Special Con-
sumption Tax, Vietnam Official Gazette, April 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL
11778604; VN Cheats on Tariffs, BUS. VIETNAM, July 1996, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Vietnm File. In addition, bureaucratic red-tape and corruption add
hidden costs. See Chua, supra note 154.
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tariffs and maintaining its level of revenue. As of May 1996, the
General Customs Department had collected only about twenty-
eight percent of its projected import/export tariffs for the year,
continuing a long history of revenue collection problems.'66 In
addition, it has been estimated that illegal trade constitutes
nearly twenty percent of Vietnam's total recorded trade."7 A
more efficient tariff collection system and increased border vigi-
lance would make up for the revenue shortfall from the lower
tariffs while still reflecting Vietnam's commitment to the goal of
tariff reduction.
Import Licensing Requirements
A second barrier to MFN status posed by Vietnam's tariff-
management system is its import permit and licensing require-
ments. Generally, a foreign company may not conduct trading
activities in Vietnam unless it receives a license to do so from
the State Committee for Cooperation and Investment
(SCCI).65 Moreover, the foreign company must conduct trade
through licensed local trading companies.'69 Permits are good
only for the categories of products listed in a company's original
application; if the company wants to export or import additional
products not included in the original permit list, it must apply
166. See Vietnam Tariff Collection Shortfall, ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 12, 1996, at
4, available in 1996 WL-WSJA 10215656.
167. See Reform Momentum, supra note 5; see also Smuggling, supra note 160
(reporting $1.4 billion in smuggled imports into Vietnam in the first nine months of
1995 and noting that "the true figure . . . could be much higher").
168. See Vietnam: Decree No. 89-CP of Dec. 15, 1995 of the Gov't on Revoking the
Procedures for Granting Export or Import Permit For Each Consignment, Vietnam
Official Gazette, Mar. 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11778508; Vietnam-Import Li-
cense Procedures, MARKET REP., Mar. 22, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Vietmn File. To apply for an import license, importers must present to the Ministry
of Trade, which oversees the SCCI, copies of the investment license, the bill of lad-
ing, and a commercial invoice from the supplier. See Mai Dung, Licensing Liabilities,
VIETNAM ECON. TIMES, July 1994, at 19. The SCCI recently has merged with the
State Planning Committee (SPC) to form the new Ministry of Planning and Invest-
ment. See Vietnam, IBC INTL COUNTRY RISK GUIDE, Dec. 1995, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Ibccrg File.
169. See Vietnam: Trade Regulations, supra note 161. About 70% of the licensed
local trading companies are state owned. See id.
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for a new permit.7 ° Such a requirement can harm the economy
because it constrains trade expansion and diversification.
171
The SCOrs reluctance to issue investment permits for pure
trade purposes is another potential problem. 72 The govern-
ment typically prefers investments that offer some form of val-
ue-added service, such as goods targeted at the manufacturing
and industrial sectors. 73 Such reluctance restricts the types of
goods which may be exported to Vietnam.
Vietnam has attempted to revise its licensing and permitting
procedures by allowing privately owned firms to hold permits to
import and export. 74 In addition to providing an alternative to
the state-run trading companies for foreign investors, the re-
vised procedures are important because private firms are con-
tributing an increasing share of exports to the economy.'75 A
second improvement is that licenses no longer are required to
accompany each shipment. 76 As customs procedures and sta-
tistical collection become more efficient, the need for licensing
should disappear altogether.
7
Foreign Investment Restrictions
Under FIL, three types of investment are permitted: the con-
tractual business cooperation, 17 the joint venture, 79 and the
170. See Reform Priorities-Foreign Trade, supra note 151, at 8.
171. See id.
172. See Vietnam-Import License Procedures, supra note 168. A pure trading ac-
tivity is an enterprise whose primary aim "is to import items wholesale from abroad
for sale." Id.
173. See id.
174. See Reform Priorities-Foreign Trade, supra note 151, at 8.
175. See id. Nevertheless, many private exporters still have to trade through an
authorized trading company, which increases their costs of doing business. See id.
176. See Vietnam Regulations: Import, Export Procedures Simplified, EIU
ViewsWire, Apr. 3, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Alleiu. Previously, a li-
cense was required for each shipment in addition to the Foreign Trade permit neces-
sary to import or export goods. See id.
177. See Reform Priorities-Foreign Trade, supra note 151, at 8.
178. Article 5 of the 1987 FIL establishes that "[a] foreign partner and a Viet-
namese partner may enter into contractual business cooperation." Law on Foreign
Investment in Vietnam of 1987 (1987 FIL), art. 5, amended by Act of June 30, 1990,
reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 930 (1991). The rights and obligations of each partner are de-
termined through mutual agreement and should be expressly stated in the business
cooperation contract. See id. Contractual business cooperation enables the investor to
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wholly foreign-owned enterprise."' The licensing process for
any of the investment vehicles is time-consuming and costly to
the foreign investor. Beyond choosing an appropriate location for
a venture and the right partner, the investor must deal with a
lengthy administrative process that requires multiple approvals
at both the national and local levels."' The many layers of ap-
conduct business in Vietnam without creating a new legal entity. See James Taylor
Jr., Vietnam: The Current Legal Environment for U.S. Investors, 25 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 469, 473 (1994).
179. See 1987 FIL, art. 6. A joint venture is "an enterprise jointly set up in Viet-
nam by the foreign and Vietnamese partners, based on a joint venture contract or
an agreement concluded between the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet-
nam and a foreign government." Id. art. 2. Vietnamese authorities favor joint ven-
tures because they involve local partners in national development more effectively
than do other investment structures. See AN INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO VIETNAM 10
(Christopher Zach ed., 1995). Foreign investors also may prefer the joint venture be-
cause without the benefit of a local partner, the enterprise may encounter serious
problems in negotiating bureaucratic obstacles. See F. Gale Connor, Vietnam: Trad-
ing with the Enemy or Investing in the Future?, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 481,
483 (1994).
180. 1987 FIL, art. 14. The wholly foreign-owned enterprise offers foreign inves-
tors "limited liability and full control." Stauch, supra note 10, at 1016. Although the
wholly foreign-owned enterprise brings with it the influence of foreign expertise in
management and production, the requirements for setting up a wholly foreign-owned
enterprise are fairly strict. See AN INvEsTOR's GUIDE TO VIETNAM, supra note 179,
at 10. The bias toward the joint venture means that, in order to be approved, a
wholly foreign-owned enterprise's investment must be either in a high-priority invest-
ment area or substantial enough to warrant preferential treatment. See id. Roughly
80% of all foreign direct investment (FDI) in Vietnam is allotted to joint ventures.
In contrast, wholly foreign-owned enterprises comprise less than 5% of all FDI, while
only 15% of the projects are contractual business cooperations. See Pham Van
Thuyet, Legal Framework and Private Sector Development in Transitional Economies:
The Case of Viet-Nam, 27 LAW & POLY INT'L BUS. 541, 569-70 (1996).
181. See Vietnam's Transition to a Market Economy; I: Reform Priorities-Foreign
Direct Investment, E. ASIAN EXEcUTIVE REP., Dec. 15, 1993, at 9, available in
LEXIS, Asiapo Library, Easian File. The process involved in gaining approval for a
joint venture license could take anywhere from six months to two years. See Jona-
than L. Golin, Tiger by the Tail, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1995, at 62, 64. At the national
level, the SCCI is responsible for approving the joint venture application. See
McGrath, supra note 27, at 2113. The application must be accompanied by the
venture's charter and a feasibility study, see 1987 FIL, art. 37, that sets forth the
"proposed business scope of the ... venture, the investment to be made by both
parties, the benefits it will bring to the country and region, the estimated profitabili-
ty of the enterprise and the environmental impact of the venture." AN INVESTOR'S
GUIDE TO VIETNAM, supra note 179, at 11. In addition, the investor must prepare a
letter of intent to be approved by the local People's Committee, which is made up of
local bureaucrats in the area where the project will be located. See id. Once the ap-
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proval required to get a project off the ground can negatively
influence a company's decision to invest in Vietnam and may
undermine governmental efforts to promote simplicity and acces-
sibility in its foreign investment laws.'82
For joint ventures, a distinct disadvantage to foreign investors
is that all major decisions must be made unanimously by the
Board of Management, including the decisions whether to adopt
the annual budget and appoint managerial personnel. 8 ' The
FIL requires that each Board of Management include at least
two representatives for each partner in the venture." 4 This re-
quirement can be unfair to foreign investors, particularly be-
cause, in the majority of projects, the Vietnamese investor's sole
contribution to the venture is the land or building where the
project is located, while the foreign investor has provided all of
the financial capital.'85 Because in many cases the Vietnamese
plication has been filed with the SCCI, the SCCI has 50 days to submit its opinion
on large-scale and sensitive investments to the Prime Minister. See Mathilde L.
Genovese, Succeeding in Vietnam's Emerging Market Economy; Part II-Feasibility
Studies, Approval, Guarantees, Strategies, E. ASIAN EXEcUTIVE REP., June 15, 1995,
at 6, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Easian File. Such projects commonly are
known as Group A projects. See id. Group A projects include those with:
investment capital of $40 million or more in airports, cement, chemicals,
cultural and tourist centers, electricity, electronics, metallurgy, mining, oil
and gas, real estate, seaports, telecommunications and trade centers; pro-
jects involving infrastructure ... ; projects involving culture, the press
and publishing, national defense and security; and projects using five or
more hectares of urban land or 50 or more hectares of other land.
Id. The Prime Minister has the final decision on the project; however, before the
project even is presented to the Prime Minister, more than 65 other signatures are
required. See id. For other projects, which are considered Group B projects, the
SCCI has 45 days to notify investors of its decision. See id. At the local level, if the
People's Committee of the province fails to submit its opinion on the project to the
SCCI within 45 days, it is deemed to have granted approval. See id. For a full de-
scription of Vietnam's elaborate foreign investment approval process, see Van Thuyet,
supra note 180, at 597-98.
182. See Camellia Ngo, Note, Foreign Investment Promotion: Thailand As a Model
for Economic Development in Vietnam, 16 HASTINGS INTL & CoMP. L. REv. 67, 81
(1992). Moreover, at each level of approval, investors in Vietnam may have to bribe
officials responsible for processing their applications. See id. at 96. As the process
continues and the stakes increase, the likelihood increases that an official, knowing
what is at risk, may hold out for higher benefits. See id.
183. See 1987 FIL, art. 13; see also Frederick Burke, Legal Aspects of Business in
Vietnam, BUS. VIETNAM, Feb. 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnm File.
184. See 1987 FIL, art. 12.
185. See Mathilde L. Genovese, Succeeding in Vietnam's Emerging Market
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representatives may not fully comprehend international business
practices, management techniques, or marketing tactics, they
may not foresee the long-term necessity of a particular business
decision and may create a voting bloc to oppose the action in or-
der to serve short-term goals.' As a result of the unanimity
requirement, the Board of Management may deadlock on impor-
tant issues, putting the success of the project at risk.87
A third limitation on foreign investment is the period of time
during which a government license is valid. Article 15 of the FIL
states that "[t]he duration of an enterprise with foreign invested
capital shall not exceed twenty (20) years." 8' In limited cir-
cumstances, the duration of the license may be extended; howev-
er, the extension depends upon "the amount of the investment,
the length of time required to obtain a return on the investment,
whether the investment is a priority investment, and whether
the project is located in a difficult environment."'89 In many in-
vestment projects, therefore, a foreign investor will be reluctant
even to begin the project if he cannot be certain that he will re-
ceive an adequate return on the investment within the term of
the license. Additionally, in many joint ventures, the foreign in-
vestor at some point may be required to surrender ownership of
all or part of the equity of the enterprise to the local partner or
the government. 9 ' Thus, there is no incentive to replace, re-
pair or renovate worn-out machinery and equipment during the
Economy; Part I-Representative Offices, Types of Foreign Investment, E. ASIAN EX-
ECUTIVE REP., May 15, 1995, at 7, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Easian File.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. 1987 FIL, art. 15.
189. Genovese, supra note 185, at 7. Projects falling within the Group A designa-
tion are considered to be priority projects. Cf Genovese, supra note 181, at 6. Li-
censes for some projects may be extended for up to 50 years if the projects involve
natural resources or large, long-term investments. See Decree Regulating in Detail
the Implementation of the Law on Foreign Investment, 30 I.L.M. 942, 953-54 art. 44
(1991); see also Hoang Van Huan, Vietnam Continues To Assess Changes to the For-
eign Investment Law, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Mar. 11, 1996, at 12, available in
1996 WL 8391122 (noting that 1992 amendments to the FIL extended the duration
of a joint venture project to 50 or even 70 years under certain circumstances).
190. See Irwin Jay Robinson, Current Problems and Opportunities in Vietnam and
American Shortsightedness: A Commentary, BUS. VIETNAM, July 1995, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnm File.
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latter years of a project because little chance of recouping the in-
vestment exists.19'
The Vietnamese government has responded to concerns re-
garding investment restrictions by streamlining the application
process.1 92 In legislation issued at the end of 1994, the Viet-
namese government proposed expediting the processing time for
projects at the national level, thereby reducing the evaluation
time on most projects to two months rather than three. 9 ' In
addition, the government has sought to limit the role of local
authorities by prohibiting the formation of the local committees
that evaluate business projects.'
Despite the positive actions taken by the Vietnamese govern-
ment, however, not every proposed change promises to improve
investment opportunities. In a bill submitted to the Prime Min-
ister in September 1995, the SCCI proposed cutting the length
of investment licenses for foreign hotel and office blocks by fif-
teen to twenty percent, in the hopes that Vietnamese parties
could gain control of the properties earlier.'95 The shorter
length of time could dissuade foreign investors from beginning
hotel and office projects in Vietnam altogether.'96
Foreign Exchange Controls
Foreign exchange controls are another area of great concern to
the United States government.'97 Most troubling to U.S. trade
representatives has been the requirement that foreign compa-
191. See id.
192. See Vietnam Is Planning Legislation To Encourage Foreign Investment, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., July 11, 1994, at 4, available in 1994 WL-WSJA 2005172 [hereinafter
Legislation To Encourage Foreign Investment].
193. See id.; Van Thuyet, supra note 180, at 571.
194. See Legislation To Encourage Foreign Investment, supra note 192.
195. See Jeremy Grant, Temporary Stop on Investment Licences in Vietnam, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1995, at 3, available in LEXIS, Asiape Library, Fintme File; VN
Laws Frustrate Investors, Bus. VIETNAM, Dec. 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Li-
brary, Vietnam File.
196. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text. The Vietnamese government
also seeks to increase its stake in the joint ventures, not by adding capital to pro-
jects, but by revaluing its land contributions. See VN Laws Frustrate Investors, supra
note 195.
197. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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nies keep a foreign currency account within Vietnam and main-
tain a balance sufficient to satisfy all of their foreign currency
expenditures, including any repatriation of profits. 9 ' Such re-
patriations are allowed only at the end of each financial
year.' Moreover, if the amount of the transfer exceeds the
investor's initial capital contribution and reinvested profits, the
investor must apply to the SCCI for special permission to trans-
fer the funds."'
In addition, all currency exchanges must be made at the State
Bank of Vietnam's official exchange rate.2"' This requirement
fails to address the potential discrepancies that may arise in the
exchange rate between the time of investment and the time of
transfer;. 2 consequently, investors stand to lose money if the
dong should depreciate during the period of investment. This
would pose a particular problem if the Vietnamese government
should decide to devalue the dong in order to improve its trade
deficit."' While such a decision would close the trade gap over
198. See The Straight Dope on Foreign Exchange Controls, VIETNAM INVESTMENT
REV., June 26, 1995, at 14, available in 1995 WL 14180615.
199. See id. Furthermore, repatriation of profits will not be permitted until taxes
are paid on the amount and all financial obligations to the State Bank of Vietnam
are satisfied. See id.
200. See id.
201. See 1987 FIL, art. 24, amended by Act of June 30, 1990, reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 930 (1991); Vietnam: Forex Regulations, EIU ViewsWire, Jan. 30, 1997, avail-
able in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Alleiu File. In August 1994, the Vietnamese gov-
ernment made it even more difficult to obtain foreign currency in Vietnam by issu-
ing an order requiring virtually all transactions to be conducted in dong, the nation-
al currency. See Vietnam: Forex Regulations, supra. The new policy is onerous be-
cause the dong is considered to be a "soft" currency and not easily convertible to
"hard" currencies regularly traded on the foreign exchange markets, such as the dol-
lar, yen or Deutsche Mark. See Van Thuyet, supra note 180, at 573. Purposes for
which approval is granted to use foreign currency in Vietnam include: "[i]mporting
materials and services for the enterprise; [playing wages to foreign employees;
[playing the interest on borrowings; [riepaying foreign currency loans; [playing Viet-
namese organisations that have the right to receive foreign exchange; [clontributing
capital to the foreign investment project; [and] [b]uying government bonds." Vietnam:
Forex Regulations, supra:
202. See id.
203. See John Chalmers, Bankers Urge Caution As Vietnam Mulls Devaluation,
Reuters North American Wire, Sept. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Vietnm File. This, in fact, happened in December 1996 when the State Bank of Viet-
nam moved its official rate to 11,044 dong per dollar from 11,039 in an effort to
close Vietnam's trade gap. See Vietnam Dong Easier After State Bank Eases Floor,
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the short-term, it would also undermine public confidence in the
local currency and raise the cost of importing capital goods, thus
stunting long-term domestic and foreign investment growth." 4
To allay investor fears, therefore, the Vietnamese government
should be prepared to ease remittance requirements to facilitate
the return of capital to foreign investors. First, it should lift re-
strictions on an investor's ability to send money back to his
home country,"5 thereby allowing the investor to preserve the
value of his investment. Second, the government should elimi-
nate the lengthy approval process required by the SCCI for repa-
triation of capital in cases where the amount exceeds the basis
of the investment. In the long run, tight foreign exchange condi-
tions should be alleviated as Vietnam becomes increasingly
successful at stabilizing its currency, generating trade surpluses,
and limiting inflation." 6
Dispute Resolution
Finally, the U.S. government has noted the lack of effective
dispute resolution mechanisms as a cause for concern.2 7 Three
main methods of enforcement currently exist in Vietnam: the
court system, arbitration, and administrative orders.0 ' In gen-
eral, however, socialist countries prefer arbitration over litiga-
tion as a method of dispute resolution.00
The FIL provides that arbitration should be used to resolve
disputes among foreign and Vietnamese parties to a joint ven-
ture;21 however, it does not designate a method of dispute res-
olution for conflicts between foreign investors and the Vietnam-
Reuters Financial Service, Dec. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Viet-
nam File.
204. See Chalmers, supra note 203.
205. Currently, profits cannot be repatriated until profit tax is paid on it at the
end of the fiscal year. See Vietnam: Forex Regulations, supra note 201.
206. See Robert L. Wunker, The Laws of Vietnam Affecting Foreign Investment, 28
INTL LAW. 363, 375 (1994).
207. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
208. See NATALIE G. LICHTENSTEIN, A SURVEY OF VIET NAM's LEGAL FRAEWoRK
IN TRANSITION 58 (World Bank Working Paper No. 1291, 1994).
209. See id.
210. See 1987 FIL, art. 25, amended by Act of June 30, 1990, reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 930 (1991).
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ese government. 1' Foreign investors prefer that matters be
settled by international arbitration rather than by Vietnamese
courts, but because of the government's refusal to relinquish ju-
risdiction, investors must prepare to deal with the Vietnamese
courts in any potential disputes.2 2 Even if the investor wisely
puts a clause in the contract agreeing to settle disputes by in-
ternational arbitration, it still is questionable whether the inves-
tor will be able to enforce the decision in Vietnamese courts, be-
cause Vietnam is not currently a party to the New York Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards.213 Thus, the combination of potential bias toward the
government in Vietnamese courts and the uncertainties involved
in the enforcement of arbitral awards increases the risks for for-
eign investors and, in many cases, may dissuade foreign inves-
tors from pursuing projects in Vietnam.214
There are encouraging signs, however, that Vietnamese legis-
lators have recognized the perceived deficiencies in the country's
court system.2"5 In 1993, the National Assembly created a new
arbitral structure to resolve commercial disputes between for-
eign investors and Vietnamese commercial partners by estab-
lishing the Economic Court and the Vietnam International Arbi-
tration Centre.2"6 It may take some time, however, for these
fora to develop expertise in settling commercial disputes; in the
near future, international arbitration will remain the preferred
method of dispute resolution for foreign investors doing business
in Vietnam.1 7 To that end, Vietnam passed a Law on the En-
forcement of Foreign Civil Judgements that went into effect on
211. See Note, Protection of Foreign Direct Investment in a New World Order:
Vietnam-A Case Study, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2007 (1994) [hereinafter Protection
of FDI]. Decree No. 18-CP, which implements the FIL, merely directs that such
disputes "shall be brought before a Government competent authority." Id (quoting
Decree No. 18-CP art. 102) (emphasis added).
212. See id.
213. See Vietnam: How Legal Is Arbitration?, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REv., Jan. 2,
1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnm File.
214. See Protection of FDI, supra note 211, at 2007.
215. See Economic Courts: ResolvingDisputes, VIETNAM ECON. TIMES, Sept. 1994, at 30.
216. See id. The International Arbitration Centre is designed to be a neutral
forum for the resolution of international commercial disputes. See Van Thuyet, supra
note 180, at 573.
217. See Economic Courts: Resolving Disputes, supra note 215, at 30.
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January 1, 1996. Under the new law, foreign arbitral awards
may be enforced in Vietnam if the awards were made in a coun-
try with which Vietnam has executed an international arbitral
agreement.218 Vietnam's efforts to develop a court system that
is more sensitive to the rights of foreigners will encourage more
investment in Vietnam as companies gain assurance that, in the
event of a dispute, their interests will be protected.
Underdevelopment of Legal Framework
Underlying all of these barriers to a successfully negotiated
bilateral commercial agreement is the simple reality that much
of the legal framework required for a market economy in Viet-
nam still is in development. The current legal structure is a
"hodgepodge of remnants of the French civil law system,
pre-doi moi socialist decrees, and the recent proliferation of
commercially oriented regulations lifted wholesale from market
economies."219 The Vietnamese government "has become a vir-
tual legislation factory with new laws, decrees, circulars, direc-
tives and regulations, often in draft form, coming out almost
weekly."220 Because Vietnam lacks a central publishing service,
people find out about new regulations months after their enact-
ment.22 It is exceedingly difficult, therefore, for investors to be
certain that their investments comply with the law, because
what may be legal today might not be legal tomorrow. Even so,
the problem "is not so much the absence of law but a lack of
experience in dealing with commercial business concepts."222
For many Vietnamese officials, the change from communism
means that they are having to rethink their methods of attract-
ing foreign investments.223 Unfortunately, instead of creating
an environment that encourages more foreign investment and
218. See Regulatory Watch in Vietnam, EIU Business Asia, Mar. 25, 1996, avail-
able in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Alleiu File. To date, Vietnam has negotiated only a
few international agreements, primarily with Eastern European countries. See Viet-
nam: How Legal Is Arbitration?, supra note 213.
219. Golin, supra note 181, at 63.
220. Id. at 64.
221. See id.
222. Id.
223. See Robinson, supra note 190.
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creates employment for its people, the Vietnamese government
has tried to take the profits for itself through high taxation and
onerous licensing requirements.2" Another problem is that
many Vietnamese do not appreciate that when their word is
given, whether written or oral, foreign investors have the right
to rely on it and to expect them not to change materially the
rules and conditions governing the agreement.225
Many of these concerns, however, will be addressed as
Vietnam's legal framework continues to develop and as the Viet-
namese become better acquainted with how other countries con-
duct their business activities. As time passes, attorneys will be
able to give more knowledgeable advice to clients making foreign
investments, and Vietnamese lawyers will be better able to un-
derstand the needs and objectives of foreign investors and en-
sure that foreign investments receive adequate protection.
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS ALONG THE WAY
Despite Vietnam's promising reforms, some troubling obsta-
cles still stand in the way of any potential grant of MFN status
by the United States. First, there remains great opposition with-
in the U.S. Congress to the idea of granting MFN status to the
Vietnamese in the near future."' In an effort to resolve fully
the POW/MIA issue, a group of Republicans has vowed to at-
tempt to block further progress in normalizing relations, in-
cluding blocking the passage of the bilateral trade agreement
necessary for MFN status."' President Clinton's decision to es-
224. Cf. id. (stating that "if the taxation and other conditions... are not stabilized so
as to permit the investor to make a fair profit, investment in Vietnam will decline").
225. See id. A related problem is the issue of language. The law requires that
foreign contracts also be translated into Vietnamese, and that the two versions be
"'equally binding.'" Burke, supra note 183. The discrepancies between the two ver-
sions of a contract are often so egregious that it is virtually impossible to reach a
"meeting of the minds." See id,
226. See Jacobs, supra note 90, at 16; Frye, supra note 118, at 804-06.
227. See Jacobs, supra note 90, at 16. At the time the President announced the
reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Vietnam, several new bills were introduced
criticizing the decision and denying funding for a U.S. embassy in Vietnam. See id.
House Republicans particularly have criticized the Clinton Administration's stance to-
ward Vietnam and have accused the Administration of letting the Vietnamese gov-
ernment dictate when and how it discloses information on POW/MIA remains. See
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tablish diplomatic relations in July 1995 reflected his recogni-
tion of the politics surrounding Vietnam; he timed the decision
carefully in an effort to keep it from becoming an issue during
the 1996 presidential campaign.2" Given the controversy dur-
ing the 1992 election over President Clinton's student deferment
during the Vietnam War,229 it was not surprising that Clinton
postponed any talk about a trade agreement with Vietnam until
after the 1996 election. Indeed, during a visit to Vietnam in July
1996, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake emphasized that
the POW/MIA issue remained President Clinton's highest priori-
ty in U.S.-Vietnam relations, much to the Vietnamese
government's chagrin.2 11 With President Clinton's re-elec-
tion,"' however, political opposition in the United States
should pose less of a threat to Vietnam's MFN hopes. Not sur-
prisingly, news of the election results was greeted warmly by the
Vietnamese government. 2
A second cause for concern is that even if Vietnam can reform
its legal system sufficiently, those efforts may be futile if
Vietnam's infrastructure cannot support the increased level of
foreign investment. U.S. opposition to international lending to
Vietnam during the late 1970s and 1980s meant that Vietnam
could not get financial aid to rebuild the infrastructure, particu-
larly in the north, that had been damaged extensively during
Jim Wolf, House Republicans Fault Clinton on Vietnam MIAs, Reuters North Ameri-
can Wire, June 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnm File. Senator
Robert Smith of New Hampshire has been among the most vocal opponents to nor-
malizing relations with Vietnam, complaining that not enough has been done to ac-
count fully for the more than 2000 Americans listed as MIA in Southeast Asia and
threatening to hold up Pete Peterson's nomination as ambassador to Vietnam. See
Sisk, supra note 80, at 2.
228. Former Republican Senator Robert Dole, recently defeated in his bid for the
Presidency, opposed President Clinton's decision to normalize relations with Vietnam
and threatened to fight any grant of MFN status to the Vietnamese. See Keith B.
Richburg, U.S.-Vietnam Ties Turn Out Knotty, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1996, at A10.
229. See Jacobs, supra note 90, at 16.
230. See John Chalmers, U.S. Seeks To Bolster Year-Old Ties with Vietnam,
Reuters North American Wire, July 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiape Library,
Vietnm File.
231. See Dan Balz, Clinton Wins by Wide Margin, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1996, at Al.
232. Former Enemy Vietnam Welcomes Clinton Victory, Reuters World Service,
Nov. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnm File.
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the Vietnam War.23 The roads in Vietnam are poor, the mass
transportation system is substandard, and the administration of
ports is inefficient." 4 Power shortages are widespread, and the
telecommunications system is antiquated.3 5 The total cost for
modernizing Vietnam's infrastructure has been estimated as
ranging from $44 billion to $45 billion."6 All of these problems
impede the development and growth of a favorable investment
climate as bottlenecks caused by the aging infrastructure severe-
ly restrict the free flow of goods.237 The financing now available
to Vietnam will greatly assist it in rebuilding its infrastruc-
ture."' For the time being, however, the lack of adequate in-
frastructure will continue to frustrate American investors, the
key constituency that the Vietnamese government must win
over in order to maintain pressure on the U.S. government.
Finally, the Vietnamese government must face the reality that
the market economy concept is inconsistent with the theory of
communism. The Vietnamese Constitution states: "The state
develops the multisectoral commodity economy in accordance
with the market mechanism based on state management and
socialist orientations,"3 9 a premise fundamentally at odds with
Adam Smith's notion of the "invisible hand.""0 The Communist
233. See Shultz et al., supra note 34, at 21-22; Stauch, supra note 10, at 1027.
234. See Stauch, supra note 10, at 1027-28. Less than 15% of Vietnam's 100,000
roads are paved, and many of the nation's bridges and roads are still damaged from
the Vietnam War. See id. Moreover, Vietnam's ports are so congested and inade-
quate that without improvement, shipping companies soon may refuse to stop there.
See VN Ports Face Problems, BUS. VIETNAM, July 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Vietnm File.
235. See Stauch, supra note 10, at 1033.
236. See Infrastructure Financing, EIU Business Reports, Sept. 20, 1996, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Alleiu File.
237. Cf Reginald Chua, Asian Economic Survey 1996-97-Vietnam: Economic
Growth Remains Robust, but the Current Account Deficit Is Worrisome; Foreign In-
vestors Are Becoming Fed Up with Bureaucracy and the Gradual Pace of Reforms,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1996, at 51, available in 1996 WL-WSJA 12476452 (not-
ing that the poor infrastructure is "already causing bottlenecks").
238. See Wain, supra note 4.
239. VIETNAM CONST. ch. I, art. 15 (1992), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., Supp. 1992).
240. Adam Smith refers to the market forces governed by the notions of supply
and demand as "an invisible hand." ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Liber-
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Vietnamese government appears convinced that it successfully
can implement economic reform while maintaining firm political
control, " yet no socialist country has heretofore been able to
balance these contrary principles. 2 If it appears that the gov-
ernment is losing its grasp on power, the Vietnamese govern-
ment possibly could abandon doi moi and roll back the level of
reforms." Indeed, after a promising start, many investors
have become increasingly skeptical of Vietnam's ability to realize
its full potential, citing the government's unwillingness to "make
the hard decisions."' Although Vietnam's Gross Domestic
Product has grown an average of 8.2% annually over the past
five years, much of that growth was in reaction to the institution
of doi moi reforms after years of stagnation under the Stalinist
economy. 5 Now, however, Vietnam's economy appears to be at
a crossroads. While investors wait to see what direction the
Vietnamese government intends to take regarding economic re-
form, foreign investment has declined by approximately forty-
two percent. 6 Early indications of the government's intentions
ty Classics 1981) (1775).
241. See Ngo, supra note 182, at 82. A prime example of this belief is the re-
quirement that before the government approves an investment project, it must be
satisfied that the project will "improve the economy without undermining the control
of the Communist Party." Stauch, supra note 10, at 1032. In addition, as part of its
policy statement, the Vietnamese congress in June 1996 proposed a plan to "estab-
lish Communist Party cells at foreign joint ventures." Foreign Direct Investment:
Communism Is Still a Priority, EIU Business Reports, June 30, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Alleiu File.
242. See Stauch, supra note 10, at 1030.
243. Some old-school communists already have "question[ed] the value of the U.S.
relationship and [have] urg[ed] Vietnam to pay more attention to improving ties
with China." Richburg, supra note 228, at A10. Recent signs of the Vietnamese
government's growing unease at the increased foreign influence in Vietnam include
the jailing of dissident Buddhist monks, see supra note 139 and accompanying text,
the closure of a newspaper for reporting on government corruption, see supra note
140 and accompanying text, and the announcement of a campaign against social vic-
es and negative foreign influences. See Adrian Edwards, Vietnam's Rulers Grow
Wary of Foreign Influence, Reuters World Service, Dec. 28, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Vietnm File.
244. Kristin Huckshorn, Vietnam's Tide of Negativism Turns Foreign Investors
Wary, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept. 29, 1996, at A9, available in 1996 WL 11388795
(quoting a Western businessman "disillusioned with pervasive corruption and legal
ambiguities").
245. See Chua, supra note 4, at 2.
246. See John Chalmers, Vietnam's Economic Reform at Critical Stage, Reuters
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are not good-the Communist Party issued a draft report prior
to its Party Congress in June 1996, urging that reforms "be ac-
companied by the strengthening of the role of state management
along the socialist line." 7 If the Vietnamese government
wants to sustain Vietnam's economic growth, then it must be
willing to relinquish some of its power and let the "invisible
hand" of the market guide the recovery. To that end, Vietnam
certainly will benefit from its membership in ASEAN, which
commits it to the path of economic liberalization." ASEAN
membership alone will not be enough, however, and the Viet-
namese government will have to continue to take bold measures
to convince foreign businesses that Vietnam remains a viable
long-term investment. The biggest problem remains the large
state sector.249 Despite eliminating direct subsidies to state-run
enterprises,25 the Vietnamese government remains biased to-
wards state companies to the detriment of the nascent private
sector. 1 Instead of slowing down reform to consolidate its po-
litical position, the Vietnamese government must maintain the
pace it has set and take steps to "allow private firms and state
companies to compete on equal terms" 2 if it hopes to give
American businesses a reason to continue to pressure the U.S.
government to extend MFN status to Vietnam.255
CONCLUSION
Vietnam has come a long way from the post-Vietnam War
period, when it allied itself with the Soviet Union and adopted
socialist planning principles. The overhaul of the system that be-
Business Reports, June 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnm File.
247. Chua, supra note 4, at 1 (quoting a draft report issued by the Communist
Party for the Vietnamese congress).
248. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
249. See Reginald Chua, Hanoi Needs New Policies To Buoy Growth, U.N. Says,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1996, at 3, available in 1996 WL-WSJA 12479160.
250. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
251. See Chua, supra note 249, at 3; see also supra note 135 and accompanying text.
252. Chua, supra note 249, at 3.
253. The Vietnamese government would do well to recall the promise the country
showed back in the early 1990s when American businesses played such a large role
in convincing then-President Bush to begin the normalization process. See supra
notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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gan in the mid-1980s has produced some impressive economic
statistics and bodes well for Vietnam's economic future.' This
future no doubt would be enhanced greatly by a grant of MFN
status from the United States, which would allow Vietnamese
companies to export their products to the United States at the
lowest available tariff ratesY5 The grant of MFN status from
the United States also would significantly improve Vietnam's
chances for gaining membership to the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO), thereby integrating Vietnam more fully into the
global community." Both MFN status as well as Vietnam's fu-
ture prosperity, remain heavily dependent upon the political will
of the Vietnamese government. Should Vietnamese leaders re-
alize that the key to their country's success is to allow economic
liberalization to take its course and decide to help it along with
254. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
256. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the legal and institutional founda-
tion of the multilateral trading system, which came into force on January 1, 1995.
See Thomas J. Dillon Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for
World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INTL L. 349, 357 (1995). The WTO replaces the General
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which previously had governed multilateral
trade. See id. Through membership in the WTO, Vietnam seeks to stimulate its
economy, gaining the benefits of lower import tariffs from other member countries as
a part of the MFN principle. See Le Minh Quan, Vietnam Seeks To Join GATT with
MFN Status, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., June 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Vietnm File.
In July 1994, Vietnam received WTO observer status, which allowed it to attend
WTO Council meetings and participate in discussions upon invitation. See Quoc
Vinh, Vietnam: Vietnam Granted GATT Observer Status, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV.,
July 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietun File. In January 1995, a
working party was formed to consider Vietnam's request for accession. See Interna-
tional Organization Update: WTO, INDOCHINA DIG., Feb. 10, 1995, available in
WESTLAW, Apbus Database. Despite this progress, however, Vietnam is still consid-
ered to be at least a year away from full membership in the WTO. See WTO Bid,
BUS. VIETNAM, Dec. 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnm File. Even if
Vietnam should gain WTO membership prior to negotiating a bilateral trade agree-
ment with the United States, it still will not be entitled to automatic MFN status,
however. Under GATT Article XXXV, the agreement will not apply between a new
member and any other member if "at the time of accession neither party has en-
tered into tariff negotiations with the other, and the other member does not consent
to the application." Gardner Patterson, The GATT: Categories, Problems and Proce-
dures of Membership, 1992 COLuM. BUS. L. REV. 7, 8. In other words, the United
States may still continue to deny Vietnam MFN status if they are unable to reach
agreement on a bilateral trade accord.
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the necessary legal reforms, then Vietnam will be successful in
sustaining its current level of economic growth and will provide
a lucrative opportunity for foreign investors.
For the United States, the time has come to look past its hard
feelings towards Vietnam and recognize the potential benefits to
U.S. businesses that a formal trading relationship between the
countries will bring. As discussed previously in this Note, Viet-
nam has met all of the procedural requirements under U.S. law,
leaving only the bilateral trading agreement to be negotiated. To
be sure, the United States should make every attempt to satisfy
itself that Vietnam truly intends to meet international stan-
dards in its trade and investment regime before deciding to
grant Vietnam MFN status, but it would be a mistake to wait
too long and potentially miss out on the benefits of a strong
trading relationship with the next "Asian tiger."
Ky Tran-Trong
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